











 Abstract:   Integrating H&PS

    Part One of the paper begins by recalling a historic conference in 1969 that argued the importance of work that would draw on both history and philosophy of science, two academic fields that had in the previous decades distanced themselves from one another. It goes on to review the rather mixed success of that appeal in the years since then and to suggest the need for a forum that would encourage work of that kind, of the sort that &HPS would offer. Part Two is, in effect, a case study taking a brief look at five moments in 17th century science and noting the emergence of two rather different, but in effect complementary, conceptions of natural science at that time.

                  Integrating History and Philosophy of Science
                                                                                                               Ernan McMullin

In September 1969, almost forty years ago, the Center for the Philosophy of Science at the University of Minnesota organized a major conference whose aim was not unlike that of our own conference: it was to explore the mutual relevance of the history of science and the philosophy of science for one another. Herbert Feigl, the celebrated founder of the Minnesota Center, titled his Introduction to the resulting volume: "Beyond peaceful co-existence", and wrote: "Properly conceived, the two approaches [historical and philosophical] toward a better comprehension of the scientific enterprise are not merely complementary. They interpenetrate, they illuminate each other. I am inclined to plead for a "merger" of at least some aspects (of the two)." He went on: "Since confession is 'good for the soul', I will admit that for a long time, I (along with quite a few philosophers of science of recent times) have been a 'sinner'. Some of us have been satisfied with a (degree) of ignorance in regard to the historical development of the sciences… Most of us have come to repent…."​[1]​

     Feigl's wry comment recalled an earlier time when the logicist emphasis of late positivism dominated discourse in the philosophy of science and it reminded the audience that that period was at an end, indeed that it had ended some time before. The focus of the logicist was for the most part on topics like axiomatization, explanation, and confirmation that could apparently be dealt with in formal terms; such topics supposedly constituted science as science and thus called for  the particular talent of the philosopher. At this level of abstraction, appropriate in itself, temporality had no place; history as such was simply not relevant. 
    It was the gradual broadening of this restricted horizon that had occasioned the 1969 conference. The oft-quoted opening lines of Tom Kuhn's controversial book were still echoing: "History, if viewed as a repository for more than anecdote or chronology could produce a decisive transformation in the image of science by which we are now possessed." His aim, he said, was to give "a sketch of the quite different concept of science that can emerge from the historical record of the research activity itself."​[2]​ Whether the concept of science that his book proposes did, in fact, emerge primarily from the historical record has since been questioned. But, be that as it may, there can be no doubt that the book did raise the issue of the relevance of the history of science to the philosophy of science in a forceful way.  That it had been published in the onetime flagship series of logical positivism, the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, did not go unnoticed. The shift to which Feigl alluded was already well under way, even before Kuhn entered the fray.

    Kuhn's challenge had been directed to philosophers. But the broader conception of science that he favored had obvious relevance for historians of science also, indeed had never been lost to sight among them. The decade of the 'sixties that had seen so marked a shift in the philosophy of science had not been quite as dramatic for historians of science. But in retrospect, one can discern a broadening of concerns among them over those years, less of a focus on the finished logical structure, and more on the complexity of the social and political milieux in which scientists carry on their work.  Where Feigl had counseled philosophers of science to take the historical dimension of science more seriously, on the other side of the fence he had to remind historians of science that in broadening the scope of their concerns they should not, in doing so, lose sight of the philosophical dimension of their work. It was appropriate, of course, to range as broadly as possible in investigating the variety of factors that influence the evolution of scientific thought. But, he said, “the 'good' historian of science must devote a great deal of attention to the meaning and justification of scientific knowledge claims," the area where "historians and philosophers of science largely coincide in their interests".​[3]​ He concluded with a variation on a familiar Kantian trope, not meant, I think, to be taken too seriously: "History of science without the philosophy of science would be blind, while philosophy of science without regard to history (i.e. analysis of specific cases in their cultural setting) would be empty." 
      Ten years later, the Philosophy of Science Association organized a conference devoted to current issues in the field at which the integration issue surfaced again and again. Predictably, there was wide disagreement regarding the implications of the “historicist turn” that had been going on (it was widely agreed) in at least some sectors of the philosophy of science.​[4]​  Did the proposed integration imply that philosophers should seek a warrant for their views about the nature of science in the study of its history? Was it meant to convey, at least implicitly, that scientific rationality is itself historical in character?​[5]​ By then (1979), the new historicist emphasis had led to a broadening of the concept of science itself to cover scientific practice generally and hence to a controversial claim for sociology as the appropriate discipline for science study. The “Strong Program” from the University of Edinburgh viewed the integration project as primarily involving the social history of science and proposed to treat science itself as an essentially social construction, understandable more appropriately in terms of social and political interest than in traditional epistemic terms. This was just the beginning of a debate that would consume much of the energies of philosophers of science in the 80’s and 90’s.

 To return, however, to the original integration project: as an indirect outcome of the Minnesota deliberations, a new journal, Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science, was founded in Cambridge by the late Gerd Buchdahl, one of the contributors to the Minnesota volume. SHPS has consistently over the years encouraged work of the highest quality, aimed at integrating the two fields. Meanwhile, academic positions in philosophy and history of science have multiplied and a small and, dare I say select, number of programs specializing in the joint HPS endeavor have prospered. It took strenuous efforts in the 'seventies to persuade historians and philosophers of science to meet together periodically in joint session. A compromise was eventually arrived at: the PSA and HSS would indeed meet jointly, but only once every four years. Historians noted, with some satisfaction, I suspect, that this meant that only one in four of their annual meetings would have to be shared with philosophers, whereas for philosophers, it would be one in every two of their biennials, a larger commitment. At the international level, an even more disputatious agreement was finally reached to hold the quadriennial congresses of the two professions in the same year and in succession in reasonably nearby cities but after one try (Bucharest and Moscow in the same year, 1971), the effort was given up: two congresses in succession was more than even the most hardened meeting-goer could tolerate.

     More important were developments since then in the two academic fields. Isis, the first-born of history-of-science journals publishing in English, has evolved in ways that, I suspect, would have bothered Feigl and would have utterly dismayed George Sarton, the journal's founder. What integration amounted to for a great many historians of science was taking on board a much broader conception of science as a multifarious human activity. The social, political, and broader intellectual contexts that shaped in so many ways the sciences of the past now shifted from the periphery to the center of the research concerns of a great many historians, among the younger generation in particular. What accelerated this trend, to my mind, was that the internalist aspects of the science of the great figures of the past could easily have come to seem to someone in search of an original research topic to have been already been worked over, if not to the point of exhaustion, at least to the point of diminishing returns. 
      One way or another, the historiography of science has been greatly broadened, not to say transformed, in recent decades. And the impulse for this came in part, at least, from the coordinate transformation in the philosophy of science that was going on at the same time. One consequence of this shift, of course, has been that philosophers who are concerned with the theories and theorists of the past in terms of the traditional concerns with evidence, explanation, justification, find rather less of interest in many, but I should emphasize, not all, the history-of-science journals today than they would have done of yore. On the other hand, philosophers who aim to explore the implications of the new socialization have no trouble in finding grist for their mill in recent work in the history of science. From the side of the working historian of science, however, it would seem hazardous to claim that philosophic issues or explicit reference to work in the philosophy of science play a larger role today in their work than they did forty years ago.
    But the initiative on this issue of the integration of the two fields has always seemed to lie rather more on the side of the philosophers in any case. And the reason for this is clear: philosophers, like Feigl, urged that the failure to take the temporal dimension of science seriously has impoverished the philosophy of science in the past and so a change of direction was called for. No corresponding case was made, or indeed could be made, on the side of the historian. Indeed, some historians of science would argue that the more limited horizon of the historians of science of the Sarton generation was precisely due to taking a particular philosophical vision of science all too seriously.
     How, then, has Feigl's admonition to the philosophers of science of 1969 been heeded? It depends on where one looks. One might start, for example, with the handsome volume of symposia papers from the 2004 PSA meeting that has just been published under Miriam Solomon's editorial guidance. Of the 45 papers it contains, 26 (or roughly 60%) are devoted to an exploration of specific and currently active scientific theories. 16 (or roughly 36%) treat topics in what one might call the general philosophy of science, seven of these being on traditional logicist issues and nine on some broader philosophical aspects of scientific activity. Only two of the 45 are directed to the past history of science, one involving Darwin and the other, T.H. Morgan. 
 Or one might look instead to the more recent PSA meeting in 2006, which was held jointly with the History of Science Society. Of the 176 papers on the PSA side, only about 10, or a minuscule 6%, dealt in one way or another with historically-related topics. It is more difficult to assess, on the basis of titles alone, how many papers in the HSS program dealt in a substantive way with philosophical issues. But, of the 367 (yes, 367!) papers offered, I would estimate that only very roughly 30, or about 8%, would qualify. 
    From these figures alone one might conclude that the call for work that would integrate the history and philosophy of science in a meaningful way has gone, if not unheard, at least only faintly heard, since Feigl called for a change in attitude almost forty years ago. But there is one further place to look. 1996 saw the first meeting of a new international grouping, HOPOS, whose concern is with the history of the philosophy of science. Its growth since that first meeting at Virginia Tech has been truly meteoric. Meeting every two years, alternately in North America and Europe, it appears to have built up an academic constituency faster than its founders could ever have thought possible. At its last meeting, held in Paris in 2006, there were 68 sessions spread over five days, five sessions in parallel in most of the time periods. In all, a stunning 257 papers were presented. Though the US was well represented, as one would expect, what was most significant about this meeting was that the majority of the papers were presented by European scholars. It is clear that the historical dimension of the philosophy-of-science enterprise evokes an impressive degree of scholarly interest on both sides of the Atlantic. Its future in the academy seems secure.
 Learning philosophy through study of the history of philosophy has always been a favored route. It is all the more appropriate a way to proceed when one takes into account the historical nature of the sciences themselves and thus of the philosophical reflections that they have inspired over the ages. In at least one of the HPS doctoral programs in the US, a two-semester sequence in the history of the philosophy of science is a required part of the graduate program. HOPOS is well on its way.
When the Philosophy of Science Association instituted their series of biennial meetings in the mid-sixties, one unintended consequence was to draw away papers in the philosophy of science from the annual meetings of the American Philosophical Association. This impoverishment of the APA program has become even more evident in recent years. It is almost as though philosophy of science is no longer regarded as a integral part of philosophy itself, as far as the general audience of U.S. philosophers is concerned at least. This unintended but perhaps inevitable consequence is more serious than has, I think, been generally recognized. I wonder whether the rapid success of the HOPOS conferences might not be having a similar effect on the main PSA meetings. I already noted how small a presence the historical motif now has at PSA. Could it be that those who are most likely to pursue the historical line are now turning their attention instead in the HOPOS direction?
But more to the point, where does all this leave the new enterprise we are initiating in Pittsburgh this weekend? Is there room for yet another permutation of the busy combination of H, P, and S? The aim of the new society is to promote work that blends history and philosophy of science in a single unified inquiry. The motif of integration could easily be misunderstood if it were taken to propose that history of science and philosophy of science should lose their separate identities as distinct ways of approach to the sciences, each with its own methods and concerns. This is clearly out of the question for a whole variety of reasons. No, the aim of our joint venture is much more modest. It is simply to secure a place for work that does further the interests of both sides simultaneously, without for a moment suggesting that this is the only model to be followed.

A glance at the programs of the recent HOPOS conferences, available on the Internet, will confirm the suspicion that a small amount of work of that kind is already sailing under the HOPOS flag. Part of the reason for this is, of course, that there has not been any other flag where the colors of philosophy of science and of history of science are joined. But there is another reason that bears discussion. There is an ambiguity in the HOPOS charter that tends to go unnoticed. When one turns to the past for a philosophy of science, where should one look? At the philosophical reflections of those engaged in the particular piece of scientific inquiry? Or at the strategies of that inquiry itself so far as these can be determined? The answers may be quite different. Think of what Aristotle had to say about demonstration or Newton about induction, and then compare Aristotle on living things or Newton on the laws of motion! Philosophy of science is explicit in the work of both authors in the first of these understandings, implicit in their scientific practice in the other. But the differences between the two in the case of both authors are notorious. 
As I see it, HOPOS leans to the first, to the explicit philosophies of science of the agents involved, and our new venture to the second, to the actual strategies of inquiry followed. However, a sharp division of responsibilities would obviously be difficult to achieve. It is not accidental, I take it, that HOPOS meets in the even years and the new venture will be meeting in the odd. That way, philosophers of science who are more historically engaged can look forward to a yearly reunion!
So our new venture is not looking to the explicit philosophies of science of thinkers of the past. That it leaves to HOPOS. Rather, it aims at the sciences of the past themselves and the philosophical issues that these raised and illuminated whether or not the agents involved themselves adverted to them. Creative work along these lines ought to be of interest to philosophers and historians alike. And my analysis of recent PSA, HSS, and HOPOS meetings would indicate that such work has not had the place that it surely deserves. As I look down the program of our own meeting, I am impressed by how well the chosen set of topics fit the integration theme. Our venture is quite evidently off to a good start, one that brings out better than any abstract argument would how significant the need is that &HPS  has set out to fill.
Speaking of abstract argument, in the volume that issued from the Minnesota conference of 1969, I presented, at somewhat tedious length I fear, a taxonomy of the multiple ways in which history of science and philosophy of science might be related. I don't propose to repeat anything of that sort here today. Rather than talking any further in general terms about the significance of integrated work in the history and philosophy of science, in the remainder of the time allotted to me I would prefer to sketch in broad outline an H&PS theme to which I have devoted a fair amount of effort over the years. I hope that this will contribute to making the case for the H&PS genre rather better than an abstract argument would. Not, indeed, that this audience needs any persuasion in that regard!
My aim is to recall a number of significant developments, five to be precise, in the natural philosophy of the 17th century, significant, that is, in the light of later philosophical reflection, and then to draw a broad inference from them that has both philosophical and historical import. I will begin with Johannes Kepler's Defence of Tycho against Ursus of 1600, written at Tycho Brahe's request.​[6]​ Kepler responded there to a sweeping critique of Tycho's work by Nicholas Ursus, who argued along traditional lines for the dismissal of reality claims for Tycho's semi-Copernican system as well as for mathematical astronomy generally.​[7]​ Kepler readily conceded Ursus's point that merely saving the phenomena is insufficient to prove the physical reality of the motions being attributed to the planets, but went on to argue that if a planetary hypothesis can satisfy various other criteria, it may be able to make a credible reality claim. It has to hold up over time: false hypotheses eventually betray themselves or their defenders resort to ad hoc expedients in order to avoid falsification. It should be simple. It should explain what in rivals appear as far-fetched coincidence. On  these scores, at least, Kepler argued, the Copernican hypothesis carried the mark of reality. 
But it should also, desirably, be able to appeal to what he calls "physical considerations". Now Kepler knew, of course, that neither he nor Copernicus had come up with a causal explanation of the planetary motions, the "physical consideration" that Aristotelians had always relied on as their trump card. Aristotle's planetary account might fail the test of successful prediction but it could always fall back on the merits of its neat explanation of the "why?" of planetary motions in terms of carrier spheres.
One can sense Kepler's excitement some years later when his painstaking analysis of Tycho's data on the planet Mars yielded an orbit that was too good not to be true. What if the last tile would fall into place and he could give a physical explanation of what would cause Mars to follow the elliptical path that had made the observational data fall so nicely into shape? The details of the imaginative but quite false explanation he came up with in the Astronomia nova of 1608 need not detain us long.​[8]​ Tycho's observations of the comet of 1577 had already, as Kepler put it, "destroyed the notion of real orbs"​[9]​. The sun somehow had to be the planetary mover: a vortex of light-like species emanating from a rotating sun could be responsible for the planets' onward motions. The departure of those motions from the circular to the elliptic could then be explained by invoking a magnetic attraction that varied with the orientation of the planet's magnetic poles, after the analogy of the earth's magnetic poles just proposed by Gilbert a few years before. Later,​[10]​ Kepler would modify the original explanation in a significant way by proposing a gravitational attraction between sun and planet in addition that would hold the planet in orbit.
But further details of these ingenious constructions are not relevant to the point I want to make. What is important is to grasp the epistemic role that, for Kepler, such an explanation would play. Its primary function would be to help establish the reality of the motion so described. A successful explanation, even a tentative one as he recognized his own to be, would help to show that the motions postulated by the explanation were, in fact, real motions. Only a real motion could give rise to a plausible explanation, he argued, something that the Ptolemaic and Tychonic alternatives clearly could not do. The Aristotelian nested spheres had played a similar probative role for many centuries, despite their incoherence with the predictively far more successful Ptolemaic epicycles.  Kepler here laid down a marker. It was not enough for a world system simply to save the phenomena, ideally it should explain them in causal terms as well in order to carry conviction of its truth. 
 The second moment in my story belongs to Descartes, who stretched the probative virtue of explanatory power to the breaking point. By the time he composed his major work in natural philosophy, the Principles of Philosophy, he had committed himself to an ambitious program of reduction in which he admits as basic only "bodies which are extended in length, breadth, and depth, and which have various shapes and move in various ways".​[11]​ What bodies are these? Necessarily, they must lie in a microworld below the range of our ordinary experience, and be capable of explaining in causal fashion the innumerable properties of the world we see, those qualities that for Aristotle were basic, requiring no further explanation. The only epistemic access to the particulars of that world is through effect-to-cause inference, let us call it “retroductive” inference, to appropriate a useful term introduced by C.S. Peirce.​[12]​
Descartes originally had higher hopes.​[13]​ In his earlier works, Le monde and the Discourse on the Method, he had announced a program that would depend on intuition and deduction alone and begin from principles that he could derive directly "from seeds of truth that are naturally in our souls".​[14]​ It would show how the world we know is made up of tiny corpuscles of different sizes and motions, and even more ambitiously, how such a world would (or was it: 'could'?) have gradually formed in the first place. But as he tried to carry this through, the downward sweep of deduction began to fail when he "descends to more particular things".​[15]​ At that level, the principles are simply too general to allow him to deduce how the familiar bodies of our experience could first have formed and are now constituted from the tiny elements that underlie them. Far too many possibilities open up. He reluctantly concedes: "I know of no other means to discover (which of these has been realized) than by seeking further observations whose outcomes vary according to which of these provides the correct explanation".​[16]​
Notice what has happened here. Three new factors have taken over the process of discovery originally assumed to be simply deductive. First is imagination, the visualizing of the different possible corpuscular shapes and motions that could cause, and thus explain, the particular feature of our experience. Second is the turn to observation to help decide the right one among these. And third is calling on explanatory success as the decisive epistemic criterion. It sounds very sensible. But in the work that followed, Principles of Philosophy, the middle step, the crucial turn to observation as test of explanatory hypothesis is almost entirely lacking.
What we find instead is the extraordinary product of a powerful imagination. To explain the nature of the sun, for example, Descartes attributed two different sorts of motions, rectilinear and circular, to the particles composing it. They can change shape so as to exactly fill the spaces through which they pass on their way to constituting sunlight. Their basic shape is triangular with exactly three grooves, which make them twist as they pass, helping to explain the phenomenon of magnetism. The particles constituting steel have special hooks to explain steel's tensile strength. And so on, at length and in detail. It is immediately evident why these constructions were not put to observational test: there is no way that they could have been. Descartes in the end was forced to concede regarding the versatile particles: "it is enough to explain their possible nature, even though their actual nature may be different".​[17]​ But he was insistent that their versatility at least served to confirm the principles on which his entire account was based. 
By promoting ingenuity of explanation as compensation for the lack of observational check, Descartes made explanatory hypothesis suspect in natural philosophy for many in the generations that followed. But what he did, in effect show, quite despite himself, was that the wide acceptance of the corpuscular philosophy and of the linked distinction between primary and secondary qualities compelled a form of inference quite different from either the traditional Aristotelian combination of intuition and deduction or the inductive generalization being newly touted by the more empirically minded Claiming a microworld to be responsible for the properties of the world of our everyday experience links the two as cause and effect, and points inescapably to an effect-to-cause form of inference that is necessarily hypothetical, that relies in part on explanatory success as epistemic warrant, and that gradually extends our ontological reach into domains hitherto inaccessible
My next stop will be with Robert Boyle who saw here what Descartes never really allowed himself to see. His mentor, Bacon, had already chosen the identification of heat with motion as his favored illustration of what the method of the New Organon could yield. And since the only motion that could possibly explain the warmth of, say, a hot  poker, was the motion of imperceptibly small corpuscles, Bacon was implicitly appealing to retroductive inference from effect to imperceptible cause, despite the emphasis on inductive generalization in the first book of the New Organon. In the interim, Boyle had become familiar with the immense variety of chemical reactions, and was convinced that simply taking them to demonstrate the natures of the chemical agents involved, as the Aristotelians did, was not enough. The regularities of their behvior had to be explained and the only possible explanation was corpuscular.​[18]​ 
But here he ran into difficulty. He did try to match corpuscle shapes with types of crystallization and with the action of acids or salts on metals. But he was clearly wary of the Cartesian penchant for indulging in imaginative but unanchored scenarios. In a short unpublished paper, he set down ten criteria that hypotheses pointing from observed effect to unknown cause should attempt to satisfy. He could satisfy all ten of them in the macro-world of pneumatics where he could explain the behavior of the mercury barometer by postulating the atmosphere as cause. But the micro-world was another matter. 
 In his Essay concerning the Human Understanding, Boyle's admirer, John Locke drew his own conclusions about the attempt to bridge the gap of understanding between the world of the senses and the busy corpuscular world that surely lay beneath it and was causally responsible for its main features. His first conclusion was that a "science of bodies" in the classical sense of that term lay forever out of reach. We can never know enough about the corpuscular and ethereal agencies themselves, let alone about their causal links to our sense-world, to reach anything even close to the ancient ideal of demonstration. Perhaps, then, it was this ideal itself that should be relinquished. 
      Imagination guided by analogy, he suggested, was the best hope for providing clues to the nature of the hidden causes, but thinking no doubt of the disrepute that Descartes had brought upon ventures of that sort, he went on to emphasize the need for the resultant hypotheses to be tested by experiment. Even more important was his conclusion that where knowledge of bodies was concerned, we would henceforward have to be content to live in "the twilight of probability".​[19]​ And that, he implied, might be no bad thing… 
        I need to go back a little in time for my fourth moment, to Galileo Galilei: could I overlook him? When he turned his telescope to the skies, his discoveries would begin to broaden the notion of observation, until then taken to be the unaided product of the human senses. With the telescope  began the far-reaching and at first reluctant admission of the deliverances of an instrument into the notion of what it is to "observe". Equally important, it opened up a domain of objects and events whose natures were not accessible in the direct manner on which Aristotle's natural philosophy had depended. Rather, to discover them would require imagination, effect-to-agent-cause inference and continued probing and testing whose aim would be the tentative elucidation of natures hitherto inaccessible.
Galileo's first such venture was to decode the blotches on the lunar surface, now seen in new detail.​[20]​ He speculated that they were the product of sunlight falling on different sort of lunar features, chief among them lunar mountains. In the Dialogue on Two Chief World Systems, he sets this up as an hypothesis to be tested, in detail, by the consequences drawn from it, in as elegant a piece of retroductive inference as one would find anywhere in the natural philosophy of the century. Sunlight falling on presumed mountains is presented as the agent cause of the most distinctive among the new lunar observations. With mixed success, he would rely on the same approach in characterizing the natures of Jupiter's moons, of sunspots, of comets. These first tentative steps heralded a form of retroductive causal inference that would eventually enable a continuing expansion of human understanding into the distant reaches of  both space and time..
But his best-remembered and least successful venture in inference of this sort was still earthbound. The argument on which he pinned so much hope in presenting his case for the Copernican system in the Dialogue postulated the double motions of the earth that were called for in the Copernican system as "the most fundamental and effective cause of the tides, without which they would not take place".​[21]​ Responding earlier in the book to the Aristotelian objection that such motions would cause all sorts of large-scale effects on the earth's surface that clearly do not take place, he had enunciated an inertial principle that seemed clearly at odds with the tidal argument he was now proposing. But the explanatory allure of his ingenious inference from sloshing waters to hidden motions had evidently overcome any hesitation he may have felt and convinced him that it would at least come close to certifying the reality of the postulated motions. 
But there was another and very different side to Galileo's work as well, the side for which he is best remembered. His two laws of motion do not purport to explain, they simply describe the motion that should follow if a series of impediments to free fall and projectile motions were to be successfully removed.​[22]​ "By experiments repeated a full hundred times"​[23]​, he had claimed to show that, in the in vacuo limit, all bodies fall with the same uniform acceleration. With weight consequently out of the way as a factor, he could formulate the laws in a purely geometrical form, and an attractively simple form at that. This suggested to him a second and quite different sort of warrant for the proposed law of fall. The custom and procedure of nature, he says, is "to employ the first, simplest, and easiest means". "Why should I not believe" that falling motion would ideally follow  "the simplest and most evident rule", namely uniform acceleration? This happy combination of the experimental and the intuitive he obviously thought to be epistemically irresistible
Galileo had been able to formulate two impressive and surprising regularities of nature at the price of idealizing the conditions under which they would hold. Even more important, he had done so without introducing the much-disputed issue of the agent cause of falling motion. He was quite content to leave it that way. The causal explanations for this sort of motion that were currently on offer, "fantasies" (as he called them), did not in the least appeal to him.​[24]​ To have defined the two kinds of motion in mathematical terms, he implied, was more than enough to be going on with. Some have inferred that he was dispensing with causal explanation entirely at this point. I see no reason to believe this. What he said was that it was not an opportune time to press this question and he was surely right about that! And, as we saw, he makes extensive and crucial use of causal explanation elsewhere in his work. But he had indeed created a new science, as he called it, where the uncertainties of causal hypothesis, of retroductive inference, never intruded. How far might this go?
Quite far, would, in essence, be Newton's response. To him, the final moment in my story inevitably belongs. Newton discovered that by postulating an inverse square law of attraction towards the Sun and building around it a carefully constructed dynamics, he could explain the elliptical shape of the planetary orbits and much more. Explain or simply infer? This was the ambiguity that troubled at least some readers of the Principia, like Leibniz, right from the beginning.​[25]​ On the one hand, the way in which attractions, or more generally, forces, are said to operate frequently suggests agent causes of the traditional sort. The causes could be distant bodies. The Sun, for example is sometimes said to "draw aside" planets from the rectilinear paths they would otherwise follow. Or alternatively, forces are described as "actions" that "compel" bodies to change their state of motion, sounding, in other words, as though forces themselves are somehow agent causes.
On the other hand, forces can, more often, appear to be nothing more than propensities to move in a certain way, given masses and distances, so that, thanks to the Second Law, the so-called "cause" reduces to a convenient way of redescribing the effect itself. Newton makes much of the fact that he can mathematically determine forces directly from the motions themselves, without having to specify how exactly the motions are brought about. This is what allows him to make the assertion, so important to him, that his basic mechanics is hypothesis-free. 
Even more important, it allows him to avoid a question he knew he could not answer. "The cause of gravity I know not", he admits, here using the term 'cause' in the traditional agent-cause sense. He had himself shown that the ethers of the mechanical philosophy could be excluded on observational grounds. And, like all of his contemporaries, he was firm in his belief that action at a distance could not be countenanced. So what was left? He spent much effort in the years following the publication of the Principia in a vain effort to find an acceptable alternative. The way in which he finessed that awkward question was to call upon a distinction between the mathematical and the physical approaches to natural philosophy, the distinction to which he had earlier resorted in cutting off questions about the light-rays and light-corpuscles of his optical works. 
 "For I here design only to give a mathematical notion of those forces, without considering their forces and seats"​[26]​ he declares in one of the opening Definitions of the Principia, assuming that the two sorts of inquiry are sufficiently disjoint that the first can be carried on successfully independently of the second. This is the assumption, of course,  that prompted the 'mathematical' in his book-title. In what sense, however, could a purely "mathematical" treatment claim to explain a physical motion? Not in the traditional sense of  'explain', to be sure, which would require the specification of an agent and a causal mechanism.
But, in retrospect, we can more sympathetically discern that there was at this point a new sense of the term, 'explain', in the making, implicit in the achievement of the Principia.itself.​[27]​ Newton had managed to unify the whole field of bodily motions in a single mathematically-expressed framework, employing a dynamic form of explanation  that suggested coordinated mutual action, while leaving open the mechanism of that action. He could legitimately claim that it already signified at least a qualified measure of understanding. That measure was, in effect, being presented as enough to warrant the setting aside of the agent-causal question in the interim, on the understanding that the question was postponed, not ruled out of court as his own continuing effort to answer the question made clear. There had, after all, to be some way, ultimately, to account for, and not merely describe, the fact that the strength of the gravitational force acting on a body depended on another body at a distance from it. By Newton's own reckoning, more remained to be said. But enough had been said to convince his contemporaries, most of them at least, that the Principia constituted a genuine science of nature. 
It is time now to look back, to conclude, over the territory I have been surveying from what I well know to have been a dangerously high altitude. Two rather different conceptions of what a science of nature could look like were, quite evidently, coming to exist side by side by the end of the seventeenth century. One was hypothetical; the other was, at least apparently, apodictic. One was agent-causal; the other was not. One treated observed regularities as questions rather than answers; the other transformed observed regularities into laws of nature. 
We saw hints of a retroductive model in Kepler's astronomy, in Galileo's cosmology, in Descartes' natural philosophy, and more confidently and more successfully, in the work of writers like Boyle and Huygens. This kind of science seeks to discover the underlying causal structures that could be responsible for the regularities that emerge from empirical research. It is thus ontologically expansive, though at the same time provisional, constantly subject to revision. Its hypotheses have to satisfy multiple criteria, among them that they have to fit the data in hand, situate those data in a broader causal framework, and project outwards into new test-contexts.
On the other hand, the model of science that was first hinted at in Galileo's kinematics and that came to full flower in the Principia was quite different. It appears as a tightly interconnected conceptual system whose warrant is not only the way in which it brings together a disparate field of observational data in a quasi-explanatory fashion but also the intuitive appeal of its principles. Its primary goal is to determine the most general laws of nature, like the inverse-square law. On the face of it, the eight Definitions and three Laws that define the new science of mechanics appear to dispense with the need for hypothesis, and thus might be said to come as close to the ancient ideal of demonstration as the new empiricism would allow. But the price that it pays is that its ability to throw light on natures hitherto unobserved is limited. It is one thing to postulate, as Newton did, that the corpuscles of the microworld are governed by the mechanics of the Principia. But to determine the nature of those corpuscles is something else. A different sort of science would eventually have to be called on also, one in which the construction and assessment of hypothesis are everyday.
The achievements of retroductive science in the seventeenth century were, as we saw, relatively limited. The microworld remained to all intents and purposes unplumbed. The distant worlds of planets and stars remained mysterious. No wonder, then, that Newtonian mechanics would, for a time, take on, unchallenged, the role of paradigm of what a science of nature should be. The triumphs of retroductive science in the nineteenth century still lay far ahead: atomic chemistry, optics, evolutionary biology, geology, spectroscopy, astrophysics, would all employ imaginative hypotheses to search out the hidden structures of our complex world, probing objects far distant from us in space, in time, and in scale. 
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